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In the contemporary Anglophone legal world, the identity, purpose and scope of jurisprudence is sporadically contested but, more often now, left unexamined. Perhaps because of a deep uncertainty about its nature, which has made it hard to defend intellectually, jurisprudence has increasingly, over the past few decades, been treated as having been incorporated or redefined into something with a different name – legal philosophy. Legal philosophy, as that term is now understood in Anglo-American scholarship, designates a field of theory often seen as having higher intellectual status than that which jurisprudence possessed before its incorporation or redefinition. Legal philosophy presents itself as having a clear identity and strong intellectual underpinnings located in philosophy. Its methods, choice of problems, forms of argument and criteria of relevance are seen as validated by philosophy as an academic discipline; legal philosophy is the branch of philosophy that takes law as its object.

Indeed, the tendency among many self-identified Anglophone legal philosophers has been to view jurisprudence, insofar as it is not legal philosophy in this contemporary sense, as unworthy of serious scholarly attention. And it is true that jurisprudence often seems to be a disconnected package of insights about law drawn with little discrimination from ‘non-legal’ academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences and from lawyers’ theoretical speculations on their own legal professional knowledge and practice.  In the past it seemed important for legal philosophers to attack jurisprudence’s ‘syncretism of methods’,​[1]​ the unsystematic package of approaches that characterised it in its primitive (pre-philosophical) state. Today, these attacks are usually considered unnecessary. Legal philosophers see the battle for intellectual rigour as won as far as they are concerned. Contemporary Anglophone legal philosophy tends its furrow, unconcerned with the nature of jurisprudence insofar as this could be something different from what legal philosophers do;​[2]​ jurisprudence might be acceptable as the name for a pedagogic package to broaden the minds of undergraduate law students, but this would not validate it as a serious field of academic research.

This article’s purpose is to defend jurisprudence as something more than a pedagogic package and as an enterprise distinct from legal philosophy. It argues that, however undisciplined (in academic terms) and philosophically inept its literature may often have been, it is properly seen as an important body of thought about law that aims at exploring, aiding and developing the prudentia of jurists. A dictionary search reveals that prudentia can mean acquaintance, knowledge, sagacity, prudence, discretion and foresight, which will serve as a provisional set of meanings here:​[3]​  one to attach to an ideal juristic understanding of law. On this basis, jurisprudence is not an academic field, certainly not a modern academic discipline. It is, at best, a patchwork of insights related to the idea (and ideal) of law as a practice of regulation to serve social needs and social values, as these are recognised in particular times and places. So jurisprudence, on this view, is an exploratory enterprise aimed at serving an ongoing, ever-changing juristic practice. It is not aimed at finding ultimate truth about law’s nature, or timeless, ‘essential’ or ‘necessary’ characteristics of the legal. 

What may be timeless is the task for which jurisprudence, seen in this way, should provide enlightenment: a task of making organised social regulation a valuable practice, rooted and effective in the specific contexts and historical conditions in which it exists but also aimed at serving demands for justice and security through regulation as these perennial values are understood in their time and place, and as they might be further clarified and reconciled as legal ideals. Jurisprudence, in this view, is aimed at informing those who are enduringly (usually professionally) concerned with the well-being of the idea of law as a practice in this sense, equipping them with the means of promoting that well-being (itself a matter for interpretation). For the purposes of discussion here such people with such concerns can conveniently be called ‘jurists’​[4]​ and the aim here is to defend jurisprudence as a contemporary enterprise of gathering knowledge to assist them.


BRICOLAGE JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS ENEMIES

How could such an idea of jurisprudence be unpacked? Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, edited through many editions by Michael Freeman, has been the textbook used by generations of jurisprudence students in many countries.  The book primarily serves ‘pedagogic’ jurisprudence – it relies on educational justifications which, as noted earlier, this article aims to go beyond​[5]​ – but in doing so it defends a vision of jurisprudence that rejects the claim that this should be equated with legal philosophy. The approach adopted can be called theoretical ‘bricolage’​[6]​ – a bit of this, a bit of that, with each different theory or set of ideas given a hearing; never defined ab initio as outside the agenda of debate; not required to show its pre-validated ticket of entry into the ‘province of jurisprudence’ as ‘an exclusive field of inquiry’.​[7]​ The approach is merely open-minded curiosity as to what could be inspiring, what might show law in a new light. 

Dennis Lloyd stated in presenting his textbook that he wrote ‘as a lawyer and not as a philosopher’.​[8]​ Clearly he did not regard this as a fatal flaw, but it raised the issue of how the jurisprudential project should be related to the legal philosophical one. He contented himself with rejecting (as early as 1959) what he saw as excessive claims for linguistic philosophy as a route to legal enlightenment.​[9]​ His approach continued a jurisprudential tradition that was not oriented towards defending itself in modern academic disciplinary terms. As he made clear, his reference points were law (as an immensely important social, political and moral idea) and lawyers, and not the specific disciplinary orientations of any of the humanities or social sciences. The implication was that jurisprudence did not need the credentials of these disciplines to support its validity. But this would certainly not be the only acceptable (or even necessarily the most important) way to approach law theoretically, because clearly law is not just to be studied for juristic purposes. Defending a kind of bricolage jurisprudence á la Lloyd is entirely compatible with championing, for example, legal philosophy (in collaboration with moral and political philosophy) and legal sociology as powerful enterprises aimed at the theoretical study of law and legal phenomena for mainly non-juristic purposes (but which might produce much juristically valuable knowledge along the way).

‘Open-minded curiosity’ is not enough to justify jurisprudence. Open-mindedness and curiosity can lead in many directions and surely towards the plethora of approaches to legal scholarship existing today, which have often seemed to leave jurisprudence as a backwater. In part it is because of a failure to demarcate and defend jurisprudence with sufficient clarity as a project that a need was felt to replace it with an academically rigorous legal philosophy – validated by philosophy as a profession. Despite this, many scholars have insisted on the non-equivalence of jurisprudence and legal philosophy, but usually in ways that put jurisprudence in a position of relative weakness. 

For Julius Stone,​[10]​ jurisprudence is ‘the lawyer’s extraversion’ – but how far this turning outwards should go, what it is a turning outwards from, and what is to be gained by this were not adequately explained. Stone was clear that most jurisprudential problems were different from those of philosophy​[11]​ but not about what linked those problems into a coherent enterprise. William Twining, also refusing to equate jurisprudence with legal philosophy, defines it as ‘the general or theoretical part of law as a discipline’.​[12]​ But this begs the question of the nature and boundaries of law as a discipline, and what is still needed is a unifying aim for the jurisprudential project.​[13]​ Twining once listed at least five distinct functions that jurisprudence may perform for the discipline of law.​[14]​ These can be summarised as integrating it, facilitating its relations with other disciplines, philosophising about law’s nature and functions, ‘middle order’ theorising about law as a practice, and exploring the intellectual history of legal scholarship.​[15]​ On Twining’s view legal philosophy is part of jurisprudence. But what the whole adds up to is a set of tasks without any very clear relationship between them; jurisprudence is thus described but not systematically justified. 

A popular contemporary jurisprudence text takes a different approach: ‘Jurisprudential questions, while “theoretical”, are the sorts of questions about “the nature of law” to which any lawyer or judge might be expected to provide a reasonably intelligent answer…’​[16]​ This has the virtue of linking jurisprudence not to any particular disciplinary protocols or academic field but to law as a diverse, ever-changing range of practices. It comes closest to the argument this article will make, but more needs to be said about the kind of contribution jurisprudence can make to these practices. And must every lawyer be expected to have answers to jurisprudence’s questions?

By contrast, legal philosophers are often very clear. ‘Jurisprudence,’ writes Brian Leiter, is ‘the study of philosophical problems about law’ and ‘distinctively philosophical problems… define the discipline of jurisprudence’.​[17]​ These problems are given by a certain understanding of the nature of philosophy. Beyond this, on such a view, there may be no worthwhile legal theory, and jurisprudents –  for example, critical legal theorists, feminist legal theorists, the anti-positivist Lon Fuller, postmodernists, critical race theorists, and economic analysts of law – ‘as opposed to legal philosophers’, have purveyed ‘so many half-baked ideas’.​[18]​ But this ‘philosophical view’ of jurisprudence​[19]​ has its costs. 

The following sections of this article sketch characteristics of the dominant outlook (rather than the substance) of contemporary Anglo-American legal philosophy, focusing initially on its positivist core and then considering it more broadly. I argue that these characteristics disable it from standing in for jurisprudence as the prudentia of jurists, and have made it largely unconcerned to try to do so. One consequence has been to make the juristic value of much legal philosophy controversial, and even denied altogether in some quarters. In the legal world, it seems that the question of what legal philosophy has to offer is now rarely answered. From such sceptical views of current legal philosophy (based here mainly on a collation of critiques from within the ranks of legal philosophers themselves), the article goes on to ask what jurisprudence’s special function might be and why this research field needs no specific justification from any of the particular academic disciplines that contribute to it. 


OBSERVING CONTEMPORARY LEGAL POSITIVISM

Generalisation is risky but sometimes required to attempt to gain some overall perspective on an intellectual field, a sense of its shape and orientations, and an insight into the directions of its development. So it is necessary to try to identify here some general dominant characteristics of legal philosophy despite the variety of work it encompasses. Within it, what is often seen as its central part, around which much of the rest is organised or engages, can be called contemporary legal positivism (hereafter CLP). 

This enterprise of description and analysis of the conceptual structures of law is unified most obviously by its adherents’ recognition of The Concept of Law as its originating text. ​[20]​ CLP has been said to stand ‘as victorious as any research programme in post-World War II philosophy’.​[21]​ Its founding proposition, as formulated by John Gardner, is that in any legal system ‘whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not on its merits’.​[22]​ This proposition is held to differentiate CLP from what it understands as opposing projects in legal philosophy associated with natural law theory. Thus, natural law thought is for CLP a theoretical ‘other’ against which it asserts its identity. The consequence of accepting CLP’s founding proposition is that conceptual inquiries about law can be conducted in a way that largely excludes any substantive moral or political concerns.

Indeed, it is tempting to see CLP as defined mainly by what it excludes from consideration. Gardner is explicit about this, noting that CLP’s founding proposition addresses only the issue of law’s validity;​[23]​ other philosophical questions about law exist beyond this but are not specific to CLP and hence not part of its unifying project of exploring the implications of its central proposition. This entails a commitment to the idea that what counts as law in any society is determined by the existence of certain social facts.​[24]​ Interpretation of CLP’s founding proposition produces its two opposed factions, now termed ‘exclusive’ (or hard) and ‘inclusive’ (or soft) positivism: the former claiming that what determines legal validity cannot include purely moral criteria, the latter asserting that, while some (or many) legal systems might in reality exhibit moral criteria of validity, a legal system not relying on any such moral criteria could be envisaged (and, therefore, law is still analytically separable from morality). As is well known, a huge literature now explores the ramifications of these and related claims. The focus of attention is thus on developing a rigorous concept of law based on a correct interpretation of CLP’s founding proposition.

This article is not concerned with CLP’s debates around these matters but only with what from a juristic point of view appears as their narrowness. While, as Gardner insists, they occupy only a part of legal philosophy, the intensity, intricacy and assumed crucial importance of arguments around them divert attention from other philosophical issues about law. Many theorists​[25]​ have noted (and regretted) the narrowing of the concerns of positivist legal theory over time from Bentham, to John Austin, to Hart, and on to Hart’s current CLP successors. Early legal positivism, treating law as ‘posited’ from identifiable political sources rather than produced through revelation, nature or speculative reasoning on the human condition, might be seen as providing a liberating basis for many theoretical inquiries about law’s role in relation to morality and politics. But gradually ‘the needs of a detached, descriptive jurisprudence were… relentlessly separated from the world of political theory, in which so many contestable conceptions of human nature strove endlessly with one another. This separation was not simply a dogma, open to debate, but a determination of the field of inquiry itself’.​[26]​ Tightening philosophical protocols, internalised throughout CLP, have encouraged and justified this narrowing, transmuting the enterprise of jurisprudence into a confined arena of debate, policed not by criteria of social or legal significance but by canons of technical sophistication in argument. 

Legal philosophers outside the CLP camp, and some within it, have noted this situation. Ronald Dworkin claims that CLP risks ‘intellectual insularity’, that it understands legal philosophy as ‘distinct not only from the actual practice of law, but also from the academic study of substantive and procedural fields of law’, from ‘normative political philosophy’ and from ‘sociology of law or legal anthropology…. It is, in short, a discipline that can be pursued on its own with neither background experience nor training in or even familiarity with any literature or research beyond its narrow world and few disciples. The analogy to scholastic theology is… tempting’.​[27]​ 

More restrained complaints are widespread. On one view, the legal positivist tradition has produced ‘exclusivity and disengagement’ through its particular conceptual and definitional focus, but ‘the frailty of the endeavour which rests a restrictive understanding of law on a single insight is obvious to everyone’ except those pursuing it.​[28]​ The narrowing of English positivist legal philosophy has left it only ‘a shrinking audience within the academy’; it fails ‘to communicate its ideas to those outside its own caste’.​[29]​ Anglophone legal philosophy has become a ‘small, hermetic – and rather incestuous – universe’.​[30]​

For some critics, the real indictment is that CLP has lost touch with the practice of law and its social and political contexts. To counter this, it is necessary to discard the idea ‘that the deepest questions confronting the doctrinal lawyer must await the “solution” of prior philosophical problems. A different viewpoint must prevail: one must begin from the lawyer’s perspective, the administration of justice at the concrete level…’.​[31]​ The natural lawyer John Finnis, whose work has often been seen in the past by CLP scholars as compatible with (because distinguishable from) their projects, has recently passionately condemned Hart’s CLP legacy for its complacency, blindness or narrowness of outlook, leading to its refusal to address what Finnis sees as vital and urgent political and moral issues surrounding law in contemporary society.​[32]​

An answer to these criticisms might be that, even if they point to limitations of CLP’s projects, they do not invalidate them on their own terms. At worst they might indicate the insignificance of these projects as seen from some viewpoints.​[33]​ Other criticisms, however, bite at CLP projects themselves. Brian Leiter has argued that CLP’s view that philosophy requires a ‘method of conceptual analysis via appeal to folk intuitions (as manifest, for example in ordinary language)’ has been undermined by the ‘naturalistic’ revolution in Anglophone philosophy from the 1960s.​[34]​ While CLP has recently featured debates on method, these have been ‘idiosyncratic and narrow’ and divorced from wider debates in philosophy fundamentally challenging the epistemic viability of conceptual analysis and of reliance on intuitions. But, in Leiter’s view, CLP has usually unquestioningly assumed this viability of both matters as fundamental to its practice.​[35]​ 

The kind of conceptual analysis that has been central to CLP has also been challenged by Finnis on the ground, essentially, that conceptual analysis presupposes a choice (not a discovery) of concepts (such as a concept of law) and any such choice depends on the purposes for which concepts are sought. Hence CLP’s projects of conceptual inquiry about law require an elaboration of these purposes, and therefore require the opening of CLP to matters (including moral or political matters) outside its self-imposed analytical remit.​[36]​ Efforts to go a little way towards this ‘opening’ while holding to CLP’s fundamental tenets seem to lead to much complexity.​[37]​ Otherwise, CLP sometimes attracts criticism for making assumptions about the nature of law’s social and political contexts​[38]​ that it does not see as controversial because of its lack of concern to study these contexts in an empirical and comparative manner. The issue becomes how far CLP, accepting the validity of its narrow project, is based on sufficiently firm foundations in pursuing it.

The value of CLP to any idea of jurisprudence as a broad, open inquiry is also put in doubt by criticisms of its typical modes of argument. Andrew Halpin has discussed three ways of arranging argument that are relevant here.​[39]​ One is ‘axiomatic disengagement’ in which the acceptance of a certain theoretical approach to a defined subject-matter eventually makes meaningful communication with other theoretical approaches impossible. Another is the promotion of a particular ‘insight’ (such as CLP’s founding proposition) so extensively that it is held actually to define the relevant field of inquiry; non-acceptance of the relevant insight or failure to see its full significance produces exclusion from the field of argument. The third approach, ‘splitting the subject-matter’, assigns opposing views to different categories of inquiry (so that they need not engage with each other). Halpin’s example of this last approach is Hart’s claim that his work and that of Dworkin represent entirely separate projects. What is important for the purposes of this article is that these three approaches (which Halpin sees as having helped to shape CLP) are all ways of excluding argumentative engagement, rather than encouraging the challenge of different perspectives. 

An outward-looking, curious, exploratory jurisprudence would not be served by the approaches Halpin identifies, which limit ‘external’ engagement and exploration beyond pre-defined fields. As regards the debates that do take place with critics, or even sometimes ‘internally’ within CLP, what can be observed is their frequent intensity and aggressiveness. As one commentator notes, ‘positivists and their critics have extracted innumerable technical satisfactions from their exploration of the weaknesses of each other’s positions’.​[40]​ How far does this amount to point-scoring; to what Edward Shils describes as the sharp-shooter approach of ‘those who regard intellectual activity not as the extension of understanding but a game in which the prizes go for rigour and elegance of formulation and proof, and for proving the other fellow wrong’?​[41]​ Perhaps this style, often associated with certain kinds of lawyers’ debates, carries over to the kind of philosophy that finds a home in some law schools. 

As Shils claims, intellectual sharp-shooting is not always the best way to understanding: ‘Discoveries are not made in this way, least of all self-discoveries and the discoveries of the self in one’s fellow-man’.​[42]​ But the language of much debate around CLP evokes the sharp-shooter image.​[43]​ Indeed, the image has been explicitly invoked recently by one weary protagonist in a long debate around CLP’s view of legality, seeing its culmination as the final showdown of a ‘High Noon’ encounter.​[44]​ But the irony only emphasises the destructive setting of debate.


WHY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IS NOT JURISPRUDENCE

If contemporary Anglophone legal philosophy is viewed beyond its positivist core, the problems for its jurisprudential utility appear differently. Certainly it contains a vast diversity of projects. Definitional limitations on its scope can be fixed only by reference to philosophy as its parent discipline and to some kind of concern with law as its focus. In earlier times when philosophy was less professionally compartmentalised in the academy it was easy to treat legal philosophy and jurisprudence as synonyms because both could indicate a research field unified only by a focus on speculation around law. What made problems ‘philosophical’ could remain a matter of little concern. In principle, nothing stopped jurists from declaring any of their general musings on law to be legal philosophy. Today, with legal philosophy’s identity fixed by its relationship to philosophy as an academic field, matters are different. 

This introduces a new criterion for assessing the worth of legal theoretical inquiries on the basis of whether or not they are ‘philosophically interesting’.​[45]​ And ideas that could be of juristic interest – because relevant for a general understanding of legal practice or experience – sometimes appear as ‘a philosophical mess’.​[46]​ Indeed, legal philosophical issues can, it seems, be pursued irrespective of any reference to law’s actual settings. For example, on one view, ‘the’ concept of law can be elaborated philosophically in terms of law’s ‘essential’ qualities whether or not these qualities exist in any particular social conditions; if the evidence of conditions reveals that the regulatory forms do not conform to the philosophical concept of law, it is not the concept that needs adjusting; the conclusion should rather be that in those conditions there is no law.​[47]​ What is philosophically essential is not governed by what contingently exists.

There are several problems here for any jurisprudential project concerned with ‘the idea (and ideal) of law as a practice of regulation to serve social needs and social values, as these are recognised in particular times and places’. To philosophise about law irrespective of experience in particular times and places may show limited concern for juristic relevance. Legal philosophy mainly seeks universal truths rather than knowledge rooted in the particularities of social context,​[48]​ and it is sometimes assumed that obtaining the latter would require ‘life-consuming empirical studies’ and ‘a mountain of data’.​[49]​ So, when legal philosophers refer to ‘sociological’ considerations they usually mean claims that can be made about the relevance of social conditions without actually studying these conditions. A famous instance is Hart’s claim in The Concept of Law to be engaged in a project of ‘descriptive sociology’.​[50]​ This means, for him, mainly speculation on how people actually use language – but without any empirical inquiry about this, any examination of its sociological significance, or any recognition of possible social variation in language use. 

However, what usually insulates legal philosophy from systematical empirical inquiries is ultimately not the purported difficulty of the latter but a conviction that empirical research is uninteresting as compared with efforts to discover context-free truth or to conceptualise what is essential in law, these efforts being guided by intuitions as to what is philosophically significant, or what are reliable foundations for inquiry. 

This article’s concern is not to debate whether a philosophical search for truth, the universal or the essential in law (or in anything else) is appropriate as a philosophical project. The issue is whether it is appropriate as a juristic project and whether any effort at finding knowledge of the legal world that has timeless validity can be conducted without the kinds of empirical inquiries that philosophers regard as uninteresting or practically impossible. Can one speculate about timeless or essential characteristics of law without studying the variety of forms that social regulation can take, as well as the variety of social and historical contexts that influence the ways in which theoretical issues are formulated and how far these are seen as important and meaningfulness as juristic concerns?

If jurisprudence is understood as juristic knowledge focused on promoting the well-being of the idea of law as a socially valuable practice of regulation, this knowledge must represent regulatory practices in their time and place, reflecting the variability of socio-legal conditions. Certainly, jurisprudence, understood in this way, has no need to abolish from its range of interest broad speculations in moral and political philosophy; it can surely find much inspiration in efforts to portray values and ideals of law as capable of transcending particular cultural contexts. But these wide horizons of theory need juristically to be judged against and explicitly related to local circumstances. Any pretention to timelessness and universality needs to be discounted against empirical socio-legal study of the circumstances in which juristic tasks have to be performed. From such a juristic outlook, theoretical resources appear as a continuum, involving different levels of generality, different scale and scope. But they are unified by an overarching project of serving the theoretical needs of juristic practice in its time and place, broadening this practice while keeping it rooted in changing experience; encouraging critical imagination in it by an open search for comparative and philosophically ambitious insights about legal doctrine and about the contexts in which it is created, interpreted, debated and applied.

Leaving aside contemporary legal positivism, the main juristic problem with those parts of the contemporary legal philosophical enterprise that are integrated with moral and political philosophy is not narrowness, but perhaps its opposite – the expansive ambition of the effort to find truth about some aspect of human experience.  It might be said that many philosophical projects involve no more than working out the results of rigorous reasoning from certain accepted premises. Nevertheless the product is often systems of thought – for example, theories of social justice, of liberalism as a value system, of democracy, or of the moral good – which claim or assume universal validity in relation to the matters they address. Such philosophical systems are surely of interest for jurisprudence, but they are not normally directed to juristic purposes. This is certainly so if juristic tasks require a tempering of logic with (socio-legal) experience, a pragmatic, provisional managing of deep conflicts of values and understandings, and the pursuit of legal ideals only with awareness of law’s operational limits. 

Relations between legal philosophy and empirical socio-legal inquiry are certainly matters for debate. Leiter, assuming a context of positivist legal philosophy, insists that philosophy must be ‘continuous with empirical science’, proceeding ‘in tandem’ with it ‘as a reflective attempt at synoptic clarity about the state of empirical knowledge’;​[51]​ in other words, philosophy’s task is to organise intellectually what empirical study reports as existing. The naturalistic critique entails that positivist descriptive legal philosophy depends for its validity on finding foundations in empirical inquiries about law. That must surely mean finding them especially in the related enterprises of comparative law and sociology of law: the former insofar as it reveals the empirical variability of law’s doctrinal and institutional forms, the latter insofar as it studies legal practices, institutions and experience systematically and empirically as social phenomena. In some ways, Finnis’ challenge to conceptual inquiry, noted earlier, is even more fundamental because it denies the possibility of separating CLP’s projects from legal philosophy in a larger sense, integrated with moral and political philosophy. And behind everything is the problem of the role of intuitions in determining what counts as important as a starting point for inquiry. Perhaps a key to progress is to insist that intuitions be made explicit, and justified. Such a protocol would be almost guaranteed to widen the scope of intellectual discussion.

It is possible to interpret these contemporary critiques as nudging legal philosophy in the direction of a receptiveness to an indefinite range of types of knowledge about law as an idea, a set of practices and institutions, and a field of social experience: broadening it (into wider moral and political concerns) and deepening it (to assess socio-legal conditions). A legal philosophy changing in these ways would come closer to the orientation that this article has associated with jurisprudence. For the moment, however, these kinds of critique remain only at the edges of the contemporary Anglophone legal philosophical enterprise. So, this enterprise does not provide the range of knowledge and insight to serve fully the theoretical prudentia of jurists. Legal philosophy’s protocols divide, limit and insulate it from an outward-looking curiosity about the whole range of theoretical issues that might be raised in relation to law, and about the relevance of empirical and comparative inquiries about law seen as a matter of juristic practice and social experience, varying with time and place. 






The structured character of legal philosophy today presents a striking contrast to bricolage jurisprudence. Lacking firm methodological commitments, this jurisprudence has collected, magpie-like, insights from anywhere they can be found – including, for example, English analytical jurisprudence, Scandinavian legal realism, many kinds of American and continental European theory, moral and political philosophy, economic analysis, Marxism, feminism, the comparative speculations of historical jurisprudence, and the legal anthropology of stateless societies. Linguistic limitations often confine jurisprudence’s practical reach but no disciplinary protocols do so. And it can draw on everything that legal philosophy has to offer, but it is a ‘philosophical mess’.​[54]​ What can unify it?

It is not enough to defend it in the way that pedagogic jurisprudence is often defended: as important for the ‘liberal education’ of lawyers. One might ask why lawyers need a liberal education, what that is, and why jurisprudence (rather than other subjects of study) is needed to provide it. Also, for reasons suggested earlier, it is not enough to advocate the lawyer’s ‘extraversion’ (a close relation of the liberal legal education argument). Nor is it enough to state all the varied things jurisprudence might encompass in a checklist. Something has to hold all this together, but what that is cannot be the theoretical or methodological protocols of an academic discipline. Jurisprudence is not an application to law of the disciplinary protocols of philosophy, sociology, economics or anthropology – to list only the most obvious contenders. Its orientation is not a focusing down from one or more of these disciplines to the special topic of ‘law’. It has to be a projection up from law as practice and experience into any realms of theory that can support that practice or make sense of that experience. 

It is easy to suggest how this shifts the focus of theoretical questions from a ‘legal philosophical’ orientation to a juristic one. For example, instead of asking abstractly ‘Is there a general obligation to obey the law?’ one might ask how law can best be made fit to attract a sense of obligation from those who serve it professionally and those who appeal to it or are addressed by it as citizens. Instead of asking ‘What is the nature of law as a system of rules?’ one can ask how rules operate (and should operate) in lawyers’ practice and citizens’ experience of law. Instead of asking ‘Does the concept of legality entail moral commitments?’ one might ask what moral significance legality should be expected to have, and how that might be achieved in specific socio-legal conditions. Instead of asking generally ‘Is unjust law still law?’ one might consider how far law can be just and what ‘just’ can mean: what should be understood in practice and in a particular time and place by the idea of law’s ‘flourishing’, and how can such flourishing be promoted? Instead of asking how legal philosophy affects the world (e.g. whether legal positivism has promoted liberty or tyranny) one should ask jurisprudential questions: What in juristic practice has promoted quiescence in the face of tendencies to authoritarianism in particular societies and what could help to counter such tendencies?

From this perspective it is easy to see why some of the legal theory most often disparaged in legal philosophy is sometimes seen as among the most enlightening jurisprudentially. Clear examples are the work of Lon Fuller and Karl Llewellyn. Very different theorists, they were nevertheless indisputably jurists rather than philosophers, and their focus was on law as a practice and, indeed, a craft. As one writer suggests, jurisprudence for them was ‘the love and pursuit of a sort of lawyer’s wisdom’.​[55]​ For Llewellyn, its problems arise from the need for society, through its legal specialists, to fulfil what he called the ‘law-jobs’ – practical tasks of dispute-processing, fixing lines of authority, social co-ordination, ‘smoothing friction’ with ‘vision and sense’, and integrating all the dimensions of legal work.​[56]​ For Fuller, these problems are about subjecting conduct to the governance of rules, involving the promotion of core social values to be expressed through the practice and in the experience of law.​[57]​

The idea of law as a craft may be incompatible with the idea of it as represented by any philosophically coherent system of thought. At one level, the juristic issues are about ensuring the efficiency of the tools of law for the social tasks to which it is to be directed, understanding the technical character and limits of those tools; at another the issues are about aspirations to elaborate and promote ultimate social values through law, and, indeed, to understand and assess the practice and experience of law in terms of those values. So, jurisprudence is concerned with asking about the juristic significance and meaning of such values. In one aspect, therefore, it points towards a need to clarify the nature of legal ideas as lawyers (and non-lawyers) understand these; in another it points towards exploring what the philosopher F. S. C. Northrop called the complexity of legal and ethical experience (a matter for which both philosophy and the social sciences are needed).​[58]​ In yet another aspect it involves exploring how juristic responsibilities relate to basic values (such as justice and security) generally associated with law, and to the prevailing ideologies of the society in which the jurist works.​[59]​

The essential point is that, however wide these jurisprudential inquiries become, they start from and must relate back to conditions of legal practice and experience in their particular time and place. This is why jurisprudence is unlikely to become a fully cross-cultural academic discipline, or a pursuit of universal knowledge. For that to happen, juristic experience would itself have to become uniform – perhaps in some future era of genuinely global law. Juristic practice would have to become a universal enterprise, crossing all national and cultural borders. How far it already has some limited characteristics of this universality depends on how its nature is understood. Perhaps it makes sense to distinguish a role for the jurist distinct from other legally-focused roles. The jurist’s role might be seen as entailing a wider vision than that which many practising lawyers require for their everyday work, a longer and broader focus than that typically needed by legislators and law reformers, and a less case-focused, more systematic perspective than that of most judges; so, perhaps it might be possible to suggest elements of a flexible, context-sensitive juristic idea of law that can cross frontiers.​[60]​ Yet any juristic perspective focused on such an idea needs to be rooted in narrower professional (lawyers’, legislators’, judges’, etc.) and popular (citizens’) perspectives on law. 

The broader the jurist’s vision the more universal the knowledge required to support it; and so, the more comprehensive the reach of jurisprudence should be. Its theoretical bricolage, its package of insights selected for their potential juristic relevance, can be unified only by the particular vision of the juristic role that the package supports. But the ideal of wide-ranging intellectual curiosity, which may be jurisprudence’s most attractive feature, should surely be encouraged and extended. By that means it might help to promote a more universalistic – or at least more broadly comparative – understanding of the juristic role without denying its grounding in specific socio-legal contexts.  
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